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THE DIALECTIC OF FAITH AND REASON IN 
THE ESSAYS OF MONTAIGNE 
Ann Hartle 
The question of Montaigne's sincerity in matters of faith has, in general, 
been answered in two opposite ways. On the one hand, he is said to be an 
atheist who hides his atheism behind infrequent and perfunctory assertions 
of faith and submission to the Church. On the other hand, he is said to be a 
sceptic-fideist who embraces scepticism at the philosophical level in order 
to remove the intellectual obstacles to a faith that must remain inarticulate. I 
attempt to show that the Essllljs display a dialectic of faith and reason, espe-
cially in the" Apology for Sebond u where Montaigne responds to two objec-
tions made to the project of natural theology. Commentators have described 
Montaigne's defense of Sebond as, at best, ironic because Montaigne's 
attack on reason in his reply to the second objection is, at the same time, an 
attack on Sebond's own form of rationalism. I argue that Montaigne is actu-
ally defending a transformed version of Sebond's fundamental assumption 
of the harmony of faith and reason, i.e., the harmony of examined faith and 
reformed reason. 
There are few questions about the Essays that have given rise to such radi-
cally different interpretations as the question concerning Montaigne's sin-
cerity in matters of faith. 1 On one side, there is the claim that Montaigne is 
really an atheist. This means that the passages where he does speak about 
the Christian faith must be explained away as merely rhetorical: the rhetor-
ical dimension of the Essays would be intended both to couch his teaching 
in a form that can be acceptable to his largely Christian audience and to 
protect him from censorship and persecution by the Church. This view of 
Montaigne entails the claim that he writes in the tradition of the "noble 
lie," a tradition that he clearly knows since he mentions it several times in 
the Essays. This view also finds support in the highly ambiguous character 
of the "defense" of natural theology found in the "Apology." 
At the other end of the spectrum, we have the interpretations of those 
who claim that Montaigne is a sceptic-fideist. In his Le Scepticisme de 
Montaigne, Frederic Brahami presents a compelling version of this interpre-
tation. He shows clearly that Montaigne's is a new scepticism, that he 
breaks with the ancient sceptics on the decisive issue of the sovereign good 
and goes further than the ancient sceptics in his annihilation of the pretens-
es of human reason. Brahami argues that this new scepticism is made pos-
sible, or rather, necessary, by the introduction of the Christian concept of 
God.2 Montaigne, then, would be a sceptic on the natural, philosophical 
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level, and a "fideist" at the theological level. That is, he would deny the 
ability of reason to grasp or to ground the truths of faith, and he would 
deny that faith is itself a mode of thought that can give a public account of 
itself. "The fideist founds the faith on faith; he is, literally, one for whom 
there are no reasons to believe."3 
The view of Montaigne as sceptic-fideist, finds support in Montaigne's 
praise of scepticism as the most useful of all the philosophical teachings 
because it presents man as naked, empty and weak, "annihilating his judg-
ment to make more room for faith" (V5506; F375).4 It attempts to come to 
terms with Montaigne's assertion that the immortality of the soul cannot be 
established by reason but can be known only through faith (VS554; F415). 
And it accords with his defense of his practice of avoiding the theological 
language of divine providence. Montaigne puts forward his thoughts as 
simply human, not as celestial rules, as "matter of opinion, not matter of 
faith" (V5323; F234). 
The claim that Montaigne is really an atheist who hides his atheism is, 
on one level, impossible to refute. If the atheism is really hidden, then no 
interpretation can find it and bring it out into the open. If it is only part-
ly hidden or thinly veiled, then some of the things that Montaigne says 
must be deliberately false. But how do we tell which things are false? 
Ultimately, the selection must be either arbitrary or determined by a pri-
ori criteria. Of course, this claim to a hidden meaning cannot be refuted 
by appealing to Montaigne's avowals of his sincerity, since these 
avowals themselves may be merely rhetorical. But one reason why 
many readers of Montaigne are so reluctant to accept the claim that he 
lies, even nobly, is that his lying would be a betrayal of the reader's 
trust: what is offered to us in the Essays is not a mere verbal puzzle but 
the man himself and a man of a certain character, a man for whom truth 
is a moral imperative.s 
The difficulty with the claim that Montaigne is a sceptic-fideist has to do 
with the way in which the sceptic-fideist must deliberately keep himself 
from thinking about the truths that are most important to him. I acknowl-
edge that Montaigne rejects the mode of 5ebond's natural theology, what 
Brahami calls Sebond's "rationalism." And I do recognize the need to 
make sense of Montaigne's claim that his project is simply human and of 
his apparently ambiguous defense of Sebond. But "rationalism" does not 
exhaust the meaning of thought. The sceptic-fideist interpretation really 
amounts to a frustration of the natural desire to think honestly about one's 
life and to a condition of conflict within the self that is not at all evident in 
the Essays. 50 Brahami says that faith cannot be formulated in terms of 
knowing, or even of thought. Man is a "believing thing," rather than a 
"thinking thing."6 
Where, then, is Montaigne's faith? It must be nowhere (because he is 
really an atheist) or somewhere outside the Essays (because faith is inar-
ticulate and private) or somehow in the Essays. This third possibility, that 
Montaigne's faith is somehow in the Essays, is the answer that I want to 
show to be true. We can begin, then, with the" Apology for 5ebond," 
since this essay deals so explicitly with the issue of belief. 
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The Dialectic of Faith and Reason 
Raymond Sebond was a Spanish theologian of the fifteenth century whose 
book, entitled Natural Theology or the Book of Creatures, was given to 
Montaigne's father who then asked his son to translate it from Latin into 
French. Montaigne did so and then wrote this" apology" as a response to 
two criticisms commonly made of this and other such works in natural the-
ology. Montaigne reports that someone told him that Sebond's book was 
actually a kind of distillation of the teachings of Thomas Aquinas.' 
In the Prologue to his Natural Theology, Sebond claims that God has 
revealed himself clearly in two "books:" first, in the Bible, and second, in 
Nature. Sebond holds that man can know the truth about God and himself 
by reading these truths in the book of Nature. In that book, each creature is 
like a letter and man himself is the main or capital letter. Montaigne 
describes Sebond's natural theology in this way: "His purpose is bold and 
courageous, for he w1dertakes by human and natural reasons to establish 
and prove against the atheists all the articles of the Christian religion ..... " 
(VS440;F320). Montaigne's own task in the" Apology" is to defend Sebond 
against the two principal objections that are made to his work. By describ-
ing his task in that way, Montaigne is adopting the Scholastic terminology 
and mode of presentation, although his adaptation is very loose. The 
Scholastics, including Aquinas, wrote in a highly structured form called, in 
general, "The Question." A question is posed, e.g., Does God exist?; objec-
tions to the writer's own position are stated first, then the writer presents 
his own view in the Respo1ldeo, and finally he answers the objections each 
in tum. The entire" Apology," then, in spite of its length and its appear-
ance of disorder, actually has a very simple underlying structure: the state-
ment of and response to the first objection and the statement of and 
response to the second objection. 
If we compare this to the Scholastic disputed question, we see that what 
is missing is the "body" of the Question, the author's own view or, in 
Scholastic terminology, the "Respondeo" ("I answer that...."). The highly 
structured form of the Question is intended to require the author to state 
the authoritative objections to his own position and then to allow him the 
freedom to say what he himself thinks. Where, then, is Montaigne's 
"Respondeo"? It seems to me that it must be found in what I would call a 
kind of "dialectic" between the two objections and responses. In other 
words, it would be illegitimate to identify Montaigne's own position with 
either of the two objections or even simply with his responses to both 
objections. No doubt the responses by themselves do reveal something of 
his own stance, but they do not give us the complete picture any more than 
Aquinas's replies to objections would allow us to completely reconstruct 
his own fully articulated Respondeo. The replies are consistent with the 
Respondeo and give some idea of what the Respondeo must be, but they are 
incomplete and stated in a way that is determined by the objection. What I 
will now attempt to do is to work out that dialectic. 
The first objection to Sebond's theology is put forward in the name of 
piety by those who think of themselves as believers. They say that 
"Christians do themselves harm in trying to support their belief by human 
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reasons, since it is conceived only by faith and by a particular inspiration of 
divine grace" (VS440;F321). The second objection is put forward by unbe-
lievers and atheists. Sebond's arguments, they say, are "weak and unfit to 
prove what he proposes." And these tmbelievers attempt to show that they 
can easily shatter them (VS448;F327). 
The first objection identifies faith with belief that is held by particular 
inspiration of divine grace. The second objection identifies understanding 
with autonomous reason and, thus, with unbelief, since Sebond's arguments 
cannot command universal assent. Most commentators have placed 
Montaigne himself entirely on the side of one or the other of these objections. 
The view that he is an atheist places him on the side of the second objection 
to Sebond; the view that he is a fideist places him on the side of the first 
objection. Montaigne, however, refutes both objections and he also finds 
something true in each objection, so that any interpretation of the" Apology" 
that places him simply on either side must, in my view, be inadequate. 
The two objections, as formulated by Montaigne, are usually regarded 
as the opposing and contradictory voices of belief and unbelief. Brahami, 
for example, says that "the second objection is diametrically opposed to the 
first" and that "these two radical positions, that of belief and that of unbe-
lief undermine the synthesis of Sebond."8 But when these objections are 
exposed more fully, they show themselves to be related to each other and 
even dependent on each other at a deeper level. The first objection defines 
faith in terms of its origin: faith is "belief that is conceived only by faith and 
by a particular inspiration of divine grace." God inspires those whom it 
pleases him to inspire: that is why they believe and others do not. There is 
a direct communication by God to the mind of the believer. Faith, then, is 
taken to be private, inarticulate, and incommunicable. The second objec-
tion is a reaction against the possibility of faith but it also accepts this 
understanding of what faith is. Unbelief must see faith as a private experi-
ence, an experience that it ultimately regards as illusory because it is pub-
licly indefensible. Unbelief reacts against the first objection's claim to pri-
vate knowledge and particular inspiration by putting forward as its stan-
dard what it takes to be the most public expression of the activity of the 
mind, autonomous reason. 
Rationality prides itself in being both public and common. In the first 
place, it is completely transparent and communicable: when the demon-
strations of Euclidian geometry are displayed, for example, they can be 
understood by any rational human being and they receive universal 
assent. The truths of faith, of course, do not receive universal assent. 
Secondly, rationality is universal, the defining characteristic of the human 
species, whereas particular inspiration is not universal. Therefore, on this 
view of reason, faith (understood as particular inspiration) cannot give a 
public account of itself. It is defenseless before the court of reason. 
The first and second objections, then, share the same understanding of the 
meaning of faith. It is this shared understanding that gives rise to the 
"dialectic" of the two objections, and it is this shared understanding that 
Montaigne is most deeply concerned to refute. 
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Further, the first and second objections also share the same understand-
ing of the meaning of reason. The first objection takes faith to be belief, but 
belief that each is justified in holding because it comes from God by a direct 
and particular inspiration. The beliefs that are guaranteed by particular 
inspiration are then elevated to the status of knowledge and certitude. The 
second objection sets demonstration as the standard of knowledge and 
whatever cannot meet this publicly accessible standard must count as mere 
belief or private opinion. Its demand, then, is that faith be defined and justi-
fied within the terms of the philosophical categories of knowledge, certitude, 
and doubt. The doubt to which the first objection is susceptible is due to the 
fact that faith cannot command universal assent because it cannot be demon-
strated or proven. The first objection is prey to doubt because it implicitly 
concedes the definition of reason assumed by the second objection. 
In other words, the second objection accepts the first objection's defini-
tion of faith, and the first objection accepts the second objection's definition 
of reason. It is to these shared understandings of what faith and reason are 
that Montaigne is really addressing himself. To the first objection he 
responds that faith is not belief held by particular divine inspiration. To the 
second objection he responds that reason is not autonomous and cannot 
secure universal assent. 
The dialectic between the two objections and responses begins to come 
to light when we examine the three ways in which Montaigne responds to 
the first objection. Against the claim that Christian faith is held by means of 
particular inspiration of divine grace and that faith is therefore a private, 
incommunicable experience, Montaigne pushes in the direction of the pub-
lic and the common. "We are Christians," he says, "by the same title that 
we are Perigordians or Germans" (VS445;F325). This takes the pious objec-
tor out of his own private certitude and confronts him with the fact that, 
had he been born in a very different place or time, had he not been brought 
up as a Christian, he would not believe as he does. Montaigne is also mov-
ing away from the claim of divine origin and toward the acknowledgment 
of the human origins of faith: "Another region, other witnesses, similar 
promises and threats, might imprint upon us in the same way a contrary 
belief" (ibid). Little Moslem and Hindu babies do not grow up to find 
themselves somehow directly inspired by God to believe the articles of 
Christian faith. By moving in the direction of human origins, we come to 
the point where Christian faith looks no different from any other religious 
belief. If it is not of divine origin, how can it claim any superior status? It 
begins to appear "that we receive our religion only in our own way and 
with our own hands, and not otherwise than as other religions are 
received. We happen to have been born in a country where it was in prac-
tice" (VS445;F324). 
Besides moving in the direction of the common and public, Montaigne 
is also moving in the direction of the natural and away from the supernat-
ural. For Christian belief now appears no different from any other "natur-
al" beliefs or customs. Just as customs vary from country to country or 
from culture to culture, so too do religious belief and practice. The terrible 
reproach to Christians, Montaigne says, is that we do not even believe in 
God to the same degree that we believe in the ordinary and natural. "If we 
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believed in him, 1 do not say by faith, but [even] with a simple belief ... if 
we believed in him just as in any other story, if we knew him like one of 
our comrades, we would love him above all other things ... "(VS444;F324). 
Montaigne is here making a distinction between faith and "simple belief" 
and this is precisely the distinction that the first objection fails to make: 
faith is belief held by particular inspiration. 1£ confidence in its divine ori-
gin is shaken, what is left is ordinary belief, belief that is unexamined and 
presumptuous. It is this that begs for reason to step in because faith no 
longer has any definitive claim to truth. The first objection's view of faith is 
one that undermines itself and easily turns to unbelief. This is why 
Montaigne agrees with those who predict that the Reformation will degen-
erate into atheism and why he attributes the second objection to atheism. 
Once "personal consent" becomes authoritative, all of the ancient beliefs 
will be shaken off "as a tyrannical yoke" (VS439;F320). 
The second way in which Montaigne responds to the first objection is by 
pointing to the lack of conformity between Christian belief and conduct. 
"All other signs are common to all religions: hope, trust, ... , ceremonies, 
penitence, martyrs. The peculiar mark of our truth should be our virtue, as 
it is also the most heavenly and difficult mark, and the worthiest product 
of truth" (VS442;F322). Once again, Montaigne is calling the objectors into 
the public realm, demanding evidence of the presence of faith. But the 
actions of most Christians give no evidence of such faith: "so divine and 
celestial a teaching as ours marks Christians only by their words .... 
Compare our morals with a Muhammadan's or a pagan's; we always fall 
short of them. Whereas, in view of the advantage of our religion, we 
should shine with excellence at an extreme and incomparable distance, and 
people ought to say: 'Are they so just, so charitable, so good? Then they are 
Christians"'(VS442;F322). Instead, we have civil war, extreme cruelty, 
vengeance and hatred. Montaigne says: "There is no hostility that excels 
CiU'istian hostility" (VS444;F324). 
The failure of Christian moral action is a sign of the inadequacy of the 
first objection's understanding of what faith is. In some cases, the lack of 
conformity between belief and conduct entails hypocrisy and a deliberate 
attempt to deceive others. But in most cases, it is simply a matter of self-
deception: "Some make the world [think] that they believe what they do 
not [really] believe. Others, in greater number, make themselves believe it, 
being unable to penetrate what it means to believe" (VS442;F322). 
The third way in which Montaigne responds to the first objection is by 
appealing to the authority that the pious believer must acknowledge, the 
first great commandment: "Thou shalt love the Lord, thy God, with all thy 
heart, with all thy soul, and with all thy mind." God commands that we 
10V{:~ him with our minds and it is this commandment that justifies the pro-
ject of theology. The theologians interpret the commandment, as Sebond 
does, along the lines of natural philosophy, seeking the truth about God in 
the book of nature and appealing especially to st. Paul's claim that "the 
invisible things of God appear by the creation of the world, when we con-
sider his eternal wisdom and his divinity in his works" (VS446;F326). So, 
then, Montaigne concludes his response to the first objection with an asser-
tion of compatibility between faith and reason, a compatibility that the first 
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objection denies. 
Now if we consider the medieval definition of theology as "faith seeking 
understanding" we see that faith is primary. In the words of St. Anselm's 
prayer: "Grant me to understand you to be as I [already] believe you to 
be."'! As the formula of medieval theology puts it, philosophy is the "hand-
maiden" of theology. Montaigne's formulation of Sebond's project (that 
"he undertakes by human and natural reasons to ... prove against the 
atheists all the articles of the Christian religion") suggests that Sebond may 
actually be claiming something closer to the independence of reason from 
the first principles of faith, thus tending toward the reversal of Anselm's 
"unless I believe, I shall not understand" to "unless I can prove, I shall not 
believe." 
But whether or not Sebond's mode of theology is an extreme and 
unorthodox rationalism (as some have described it), Montaigne's defense 
of the mind's place in the life of faith leads him directly into the second 
objection. It is here, I think, that we get a sense of the" Apology" not sim-
ply as a response to all those others "out there" who fall within the two cat-
egories of objectors, but rather as a dialectic within Montaigne himself. For 
in the process of responding to the understanding of faith in the first objec-
tion, he suddenly finds himself speaking in the voice of unbelief. He says: 
"I have already, without thinking about it, half involved myself in the sec-
ond objection ... " (VS448;F327). 
The way in which Montaigne falls into the second objection and the way 
he characterizes reason from the very beginning of his response suggests 
that once reason is invited in, it claims for itself an authority that ultimately 
admits no other authority. There are three related aspects of reason's self-
assertion that Montaigne emphasizes. Reason inevitably tends to see itself 
as what is highest in nature, therefore as entitled to rule, and therefore as 
autonomous. Those who put forward the second objection, he says, "will 
not allow us to combat their reason except by [reason] itself" (VS449;F328). 
Reason is their only "touchstone" and they will neither receive nor 
approve anything except by way of reason (VS541;F405). The first aspect of 
the arrogance of reason which Montaigne combats is the way in which it 
immediately sets out a hierarchy within nature and places itself at the top. 
Reason sees itself at the highest point in nature because it recognizes itself 
as the divine ordering principle of nature, and then concludes that man's 
reason is in harmony with this divine ordering principle. Montaigne asks: 
"Is it possible to imagine anything so ridiculous as that this miserable and 
puny creature, [man, the rational animal] who is not even master of him-
self, exposed to the attacks of all things, should call himself master and 
emperor of the universe, the least part of which it is not in his power to 
know, much less to command?" (VS450;F329) And he characterizes the sec-
ond objectors as "these people, who think Sebond's reasons too weak, who 
are ignorant of nothing, who govern the world, who know everything" 
(VS538;F402). 
Now it must be said that this presumption of reason is very similar to 
the position taken by Sebond's natural theology: man is said to be in the 
image of God by virtue of his reason. This, of course, is why Montaigne's 
so-called "defense" of Sebond seems ambiguous or even ironic: an attack 
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on reason is an attack on the second group of objectors but, at the same 
time, it is an attack on Sebond's entire project of nahlral theology. In attack-
ing the arrogance of reason, Montaigne is acknowledging what is true in 
the first objection, namely, that Christians do themselves harm by seeking 
to support their faith by reason, if reason is presumed to be the 
autonomous reason of the second objection. So also, in demanding public 
evidence of faith, he acknowledges what is true in the second objection, 
namely, the indefensibility of claims to private inspiration. 
How, then, does Montaigne respond to the second objection, expressed 
as the presumption and autonomy of reason? He responds in two ways. 
First, he brings reason down from its heights, from its presumed divinity 
down to the level of the animals. The animal stories in the" Apology" are 
intended to bring man, the self-styled rational animal, to a recognition of 
his equality not with God but with the beasts. The thrust of Montaigne's 
argument is to show that reason is not the divine element in the human 
soul but so common, so pervasive in all of animal nature, that the unbeliev-
ers who pride themselves on their rationality should disdain this reason as 
lowly and base, by their own measure. 
Montaigne's mode of reasoning in the discussion of the animals is ana-
logical. The animal stories occur at the beginning of Montaigne's reply to 
the second objection. He introduces this section with this question: "What 
sort of faculty of ours do we not recognize in the actions of animals?" 
(VS454;F332). He then takes us through a long list of human capacities and 
points to the presence of each in the animals, e.g., reasoning, deduction, 
induction, calculation, cunning, contemplation, moral virtue, and vice. The 
mode of reasoning consists in moving from effect to cause and is based 
upon the principle "like causes produce like effects" or "from like effects 
we must infer like causes." When the fox goes out on the frozen river, 
brings his ear very near the ice to hear the water running beneath, then 
draws back or advances according to whether he finds the ice too thin or 
thick enough for his weight, why should we deny to him the faculty of rea-
soning, of ratiocination, and of drawing conclusions: "What makes a noise 
moves; what moves is not frozen; what is not frozen is liquid; what is liq-
uid gives way under weight" (VS460;F337). This process of reasoning goes 
on in ourselves. Therefore by the principle "like causes produce like 
effects" we must infer a similar faculty in the fox. 
Analogical reasoning is the mode of reasoning that Aquinas identifies as 
the way we are entitled to speak about God. Montaigne is showing that 
analogy cuts both ways: if we are justified in beginning from ourselves and 
inferring what God must be, then we must accept the appropriateness of 
this way of reasoning in thinking about animals. We are not entitled to 
engage in reasoning by analogy only when it flatters our pretensions to 
divine likeness. This willingness to liken ourselves to God is due to our 
presumption which Montaigne refers to as "our first and original malady" 
(VS452;F330). With respect to natural theology's practice of analogical rea-
soning, Montaigne says that" our overweening arrogance would pass the 
divinity through our sieve" (VS528;F393) and he refers to "this arrogance 
of trying to discover God with our eyes" (VS528;F394). It is "vain," he says, 
"to try to make guesses about God from our analogies and conjectures, to 
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regulate him and the world by our capacity and our laws ... "(VSS12;F380). 
The second way in which Montaigne responds to the objection of tmbe-
lief and the assertion of reason's autonomy is to point out and display in 
vivid detail what he calls the "unruliness" of reason, especially as it mani-
fests itself in the wild diversity of human opinion. That diversity is espe-
cially acute and instructive in the case of philosophical opinion, for here we 
supposedly see man at his best, in his "highest estate." Yet, all of the cen-
turies of philosophical speculation have not produced a single opinion on 
which there is tmiversal agreement. Montaigne says that "we shall never 
heap enough insults on the tmruliness of our mind" (VS24;FlS). Even the 
greatest thinkers have only "amused themselves with reason as with a vain 
and frivolous instrument, putting forward all sorts of notions and fancies" 
(VSS4S;F408). Philosophy herself recognizes the lillfuliness of reason: "I am 
calling reason our reveries and dreams, with the dispensation of philoso-
phy, which says that even the crazy man and the wicked man are mad 
with reason, but it is a particular sort of reason" (VSS23;F389). Finally, then, 
we must conclude that reason, to which we had turned for a common 
ground, the universal and defining characteristic of the species, is so high-
ly particularized that it cannot serve as the common, public grotmd we 
were seeking. Reason, Montaigne says, "always goes its way, even though 
crooked, lame, and broken-hipped and with falsehood as with truth ... I 
always call reason that semblance of intellect that each man fabricates in 
himself. That reason, of which, by its condition, there can be a hundred 
contradictory ones about one and the same subject, is an instrument of lead 
and wax, stretchable, pliable, and adaptable to all biases and measures ... " 
(VSS6S;F425). 
The inability of reason to secure universal assent is especially clear in 
Montaigne's criticisms of the theological view that there are "natural laws" 
which are or can be known by all men through reason. "Men," he says, 
"have done with nature as perfumers do with oil: they have sophisticated 
her with so many arguments and farfetched reasonings that she has 
become variable and particular for each man, and has lost her own con-
stant and lmiversal countenance" (VSI049-S0;F803). There may be natural 
laws that we can see in other creatures, "but in us they are lost; that fine 
human reason butts in everywhere, domineering and commanding, mud-
dling and confusing the face of things in accordance with its vanity and 
inconsistency" (VSS81;F438). So, there is nothing so absurd that it has not 
been said by some philosopher and nothing so bizarre or evil that it has not 
been the custom or law of some nation. The logic of his response to the first 
objection drove Montaigne to the common, public, universal ground of 
reason. But autonomous reason, instead of being the rock on which to 
build anything common, turns out to be a mere dream or, worse, a night-
mare that dissolves into chaos. 10 
The Harmony afFaith and Reason 
Where, then, does Montaigne himself stand on the question of the relation 
of faith and reason, at least insofar as that is revealed in the dialectic of the 
two objections? We can begin to answer this by returning to the issue of his 
sincerity in calling this essay a "defense" of Sebond. The tendency has been 
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to see Montaigne's apology for Sebond as either completely ironic or as 
unselfconsciously ambiguous and self-contradictory because, if he is either 
an atheist or a sceptic-fideist, then he must deny any harmony or compati-
bility between faith and reason, and that compatibility is Sebond's most 
fundamental assumption. 
But it seems to me that, if we see the two objections in their relation to 
each other and follow the movement of Montaigne's thought as he works 
his way through the objections and their shared understandings of reason 
and faith, we find that he is in fact defending a transformed version of 
Sebond's assumption." Montaigne calls this essay an apology for Sebond 
because he does affirm the harmony of faith and reason - but not faith as 
defined in the first objection and not reason as assumed in the second 
objection. For Montaigne, faith is not belief held by particular divine inspi-
ration, and autonomous reason is not common and universal. The harmo-
ny that he recognizes and displays in the Essays is a harmony of true faith 
and reformed reason. 
What, then, is true faith and what is reformed reason? How are they in 
harmony? Faith as defined in the first objection is incomplete, imperfect, 
and even presumptuous: it is unexamined belief and it must be completed 
and in some way transformed in its dialectic with reason. The autonomous 
reason of the second objection is proud and presumptuous: it must be 
reformed in its dialectic with faith. As we shall see, Montaigne's more 
complete response to the two objections may be stated in this way: it is 
faith, not autonomous reason, that is the ground of the common and uni-
versal. And that faith is not the opposite of thought but is itself a kind of 
thought, thought that has been purged of presumption and unruliness. 
In essay I.54, Montaigne discusses the "error" of those who "regard our 
sticking to the old ways ... as simplicity and stupidity." Some of these peo-
ple are brought through this error to "the extreme limit of Christian intelli-
gence" where they come to understand the meaning of the Church.. A sim-
ilar movement through error is mentioned in essay 1.27 and in this case it is 
made explicit that the change is in Montaigne himself. The essay is entitled 
"It is folly to measure the true and the false by our own capacity" and it 
begins with a description of the presumption of the simple, ignorant, and 
uneducated. Their presumption consists in believing too easily what they 
are told, in being "led by the ears." But the educated are also susceptible to 
presumption, indeed to a more insidious kind of presumption. Montaigne 
says: "it is foolish presumption to go around disdaining and condemning 
as false whatever does not seem likely to us; which is an ordinary vice in 
those who think they have more than common ability." Then he adds: "I 
used to do [that] once ... I felt compassion for the poor people who were 
taken in by these follies. And now I think that I was at least as much to be 
pitied myself" (VS17S-9;F132). Now Montaigne is subject neither to the 
unthinking credulity of the simple nor to the arrogant presumption of the 
learned. 
In "Of the power of the imagination" he makes a similar distinction 
between the simple and the learned. The simple think they see what they 
do not see. Here he mentions certain popular superstitions such as ghosts 
and visions. But the theologians and philosophers refuse to see what is 
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before their very own eyes. Their doubt is such, he says, that "of ... actions 
that happen in their presence they would refuse to give testimony ... and 
they know no man so intimately that they would undertake to answer 
fully for his intentions." He asks: how could these philosophers and the-
ologians possibly stake their faith on a common faith? How could they 
bring themselves to accept the testimony of simple people they don't even 
know? (VS106;F76) Montaigne, on the other hand, does stake his faith on 
the common faith and on the witnesses that God has chosen "from the 
common people, simple and ignorant" (VSSOO;F369). 
These passages reveal a mode and a movement of thought that is char-
acteristic of the Essays, a movement of ascent and descent, from low to high 
and back to low, from the lowly and ignorant to the lofty and learned and 
then back to the lowly and ignorant. That movement of thought is just 
what occurs in the dialectic of the two objections: from simple, inarticulate 
belief he ascends through doubt to autonomous rationality and then 
descends through doubt to the truth revealed in the testimony of simple 
and ignorant witnesses. Of course, he cannot simply return to or deliber-
ately adopt the stance of unthinking belief as if he had never ascended 
from it. He ends up in a kind of middle position that transcends both sim-
ple credulity and learned presumption, and that, in philosophical terms, 
would be called "learned ignorance." Perhaps this is what T.5. Eliot has in 
mind when he says that "what makes Montaigne a very great figure is that 
he succeeded . . . in giving expression to the scepticism of every human 
being. For every man who thinks and lives by thought must have his own 
scepticism, that which stops at the question, that which ends in denial, or 
that which leads to faith and which is somehow integrated into the faith 
which transcends it."12 Montaigne's scepticism is integrated into the faith 
which transcends it. The faith that has transcended and transformed doubt 
is not an unthinking and inarticulate faith but Montaigne's way of living 
the examined life as a Christian. 
For Montaigne, the common bond among men is not to be found in 
autonomous reason but in "the Church" which he calls "that great com-
mon way" (VS520;F387). The universal is not to be found in reason but in 
"the universal Church" (VS321;F232). The bond that unites all men, the 
learned and the unlearned, is the Church. The truths of faith are common 
to the lowliest village woman and the greatest theologian. What 
Montaigne means by the Church is not simply the invisible Church or the 
heavenly city of the reformers. Rome, he says, is "the only common and 
universal city. . .. It is the metropolitan city of all Christian nations; the 
Spaniard and the Frenchman, every man is at home there. To be one of the 
princes of that state one need only be of Christendom, wherever it may be" 
(VS997;F763). 
In his reply to the first objection, Montaigne discusses the reasons why 
some men are atheists. In a few cases, atheism is an opinion that they hold 
seriously. But for many, it is "out of vanity and pride in conceiving opin-
ions that are not common and that reform the world." When these people 
are near death, when they have a sword thrust in the chest, when fear or 
sickness beats down their fervor for distinction, they lift their hands to 
heaven. Then, he says,"they will not fail to come back to themselves and 
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very discreetly let themselves be formed by the common faith and exam-
ples." But there is another motive that he gives for returning to the com-
mon faith: "we are brought back to the belief in God either by force [the 
sword thrust in the chest] or by love" (VS446;F325). Where is his example 
of returning to the common faith through love? This, I believe, is 
Montaigne himself. What it means to love God with all one's mind is to 
engage in a mode of thought that finds its proper expression in the philo-
sophical but non-authoritative form of the essay. 
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